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ABSTRACT 
After the Fukushima accident, the Swiss Federal Council opted for 
withdrawal from nuclear energy in the horizon 2035. Considering 
that this decision cannot be studied in historical isolation, this article 
describes the evolution of the relationship between nuclear energy 
and the Swiss society by highlighting four distinctive periods: the 
social mobilisation of the seventies and eighties, the turning point of 
the nineties, the nuclear revival in the late 2000s and the Fukushima 
accident. To describe this relationship, we will analyse social 
mobilisation and the results of initiatives and empirical studies 
related to nuclear energy in Switzerland. 
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On 25 May 2011, two and one half months after the nuclear 
accident at Fukushima Daiichi, the Swiss Federal Council opted 
for withdrawal from nuclear energy by 2035: the actual four 
power plants in Switzerland shall operate until the end of their 
life expectancy and no new power plant shall be constructed. To 
what extent is it a direct consequence of the accident in Japan or 
the consequence of a long turbulent history between nuclear 
energy and Swiss society? The aim of this article is to 
demonstrate the relevance of the historical argument by 
describing the evolution of the relationship between nuclear 
energy and the Swiss society. 
In order to understand this relationship, some distinctive 
features are important to be reminded. First, Switzerland is 
shaped and influenced by federalism with the practices of 
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communal and cantonal autonomy; therefore the issue of energy 
is under the competencies of the Confederation and cantons
1
. 
Second, the Swiss political system of direct democracy provides 
the population with an important power: citizens can launch a 
campaign to collect signatures for a so-called ‘popular initiative’ 
on any subject and, when enough signatures have been collected, 
the population votes on the submitted subject. The popular 
initiatives contribute to a culture of deliberative and discursive 
democracy in Switzerland. 
Science, for instance biotechnology, nuclear energy or 
animal experimentation, has been the object of many initiatives 
that engendered intense public debate. 
Finally, the Swiss society lies at the crossroads of three 
cultures: French- , German- and Italian-speaking cultures, with 
German-speakers representing almost three-quarters of the Swiss 
population. The multicultural composition of the society has 
implications for the political system (representativeness) as well 
as for the media sphere (regional media in each linguistic 
region). Humanities studies have found differences in public 
attitudes towards science or the environment depending on the 
linguistic region (Diekmann et al., 2009; Crettaz von Roten, 
2012). 
‘In this article, the characteristics of the relationship between 
nuclear energy and the Swiss society will be documented by the 
analysis of social mobilisation and of the results of initiatives 
and empirical studies
2
. These characteristics will help us define 
four distinctive periods in the evolution of the relationship 
between nuclear energy and the Swiss society in the past forty 
years: the first success in the seventies and eighties, the turning 
point of the nineties, the nuclear revival in the late 2000s and the 
Fukushima accident in 2011. 
 
The four periods of the relationship  
After the Second World War spread the myth of a nuclear future 
in the hope of a peaceful use of atomic energy in Switzerland 
(Favez and Mysyrowicz, 1987) as in most Western countries 
(Bauer, 1995). As it was close to the post-war society’s values, 
this technology benefited from an unparalleled promotion, which 
CRETTAZ: SOCIETY, POLITICS AND NUCLEAR ENERGY IN SWITTZERLAND 103 
lost sight of its complexity, of associated risks, of difficulties 
related to costs and waste management. The Swiss government 
spurred the electricity industry to enter into the field of nuclear 
energy. In the 1960s, this industry designed and constructed its 
own type of atomic reactor in Lucens, in the French-speaking 
part of Switzerland. However, an accident occurred in the 
prototypical power reactor in 1969 and, following this fiasco, the 
industry gave up its own atomic technology design and deferred 
to foreign technology. After this accident, four steps have driven 
the Swiss phase-out of nuclear power according to our analysis. 
 
1970s-1980s: the first success of nuclear opponents at 
Kaiseraugst 
In Switzerland, the first nuclear plants were built at the end of 
the 1960s: Beznau in 1965, which was in operation in 1969 for 
Beznau_1 and 1971 for Beznau_2, and Mühleberg in 1967 and 
in operation in 1971. In the 1970s, the two oil crises (1973-1974 
and 1979-1980) shook the dream of infinite energy resources and 
the industry was reinforced toward the development of nuclear 
energy: the construction of another power plant at Gösgen 
started in 1973, followed by Leibstadt in 1974. 
In the 1970s, Switzerland recorded social movements linked 
to various issues, such as environmental protection, 
promulgation of peace, women empowerment, etc. (Giugny and 
Passy, 1997). The first two issues shared common themes with 
the anti-nuclear movement born at the same period. Bauer (1995) 
defined the reaction time from first innovation to public 
controversy to about twenty years for nuclear energy, and 
Switzerland follows this pattern. Anti-nuclear activists claimed a 
__________ 
1 For the evolution of the role of the State over energy in Switzerland, see 
Romerio (2008). 
2 The issue of nuclear energy has not given rise to a few specific academic 
surveys in Switzerland, besides surveys from the nuclear lobby. Therefore, we 
performed a secondary analysis of related surveys such as the International 
Social Survey Program Environment survey (ISSP 1994 and 2000, 
www.isp.org), the Eurobarometer Science (2000, 2010), Biotechnology (2002, 
2005) and Nuclear waste (2008) (EB, ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/ 
index_en.htm) and UNIVOX Umwelt surveys from Gfs (www.gfs-zh.ch). 
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planning according to ‘real’ needs of the country and not 
according to needs of an industry in uncontrolled expansions 
(Mironesco et al., 1986); they showed active resistance against 
the constructions of Gösgen and Leibstadt power plants (Favez 
and Mysyrowicz, 1987). Swiss people were also mobilized 
against power plants in construction in the bordering countries, 
i.e. Creys-Malville and Superphénix in France.  
A third construction project at Kaiseraugst, near Basel, was 
vigorously opposed: occupation of the future power station’s 
building for eleven weeks from 1 April 1975, large 
demonstrations (e.g. 20,000 people protested on 31 October 
1981), cantonal initiatives, etc. This project has raised intense 
debate on the question of the role of the State, of the respective 
competencies of the Confederation and the cantons and of 
private sector action in the energy area (Mironesco et al., 1986). 
The construction started in 1985 with the authorization given by 
parliament, but the project was given up in 1988, after years of 
fighting (Küpper, 2006). After that, electric companies opted for 
the acquisition of shares in French nuclear power plants 
(Romerio, 2008). 
The social mobilisation also took political forms: for 
instance, an initiative ‘to safeguard people’s rights and safety 
during the construction and operation of nuclear facilities’ was 
launched in 1975
3
. On 18 February 1979, the outcome of the 
vote was very close but the Swiss citizens refused the initiative 
(51.2% disagreed with the initiative, electoral turnout 49.5%). 
Then, on 20 May 1979, the citizens agreed with the ‘Atomic 
Energy Act’, which regulated the peaceful use of nuclear energy, 
and laid down the principles governing nuclear safety and 
construction
4
 (68.9% agreed, electoral turnout 37.6%). 
Despite the failure of the first initiative, anti-nuclear activists 
began to collect signatures for two new initiatives (‘for a future 
without new nuclear power plants’ and ‘for a secure, economic 
and environmentally friendly energy supply’). Citizens were 
__________ 
3 The 1970s also resulted in a series of cantonal initiatives, e.g., in canton Basel 
in 1975. 
4 The act requires clause of need as well as the settlement of the issue of nuclear 
waste and decommissioning for any proposed new nuclear plant. 
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invited to vote on those initiatives in 1984. The Federal Council 
recommended rejecting both initiatives, believing that 
Switzerland could not do without nuclear energy due to the 
increase of energy consumption, that adverse financial 
consequences would result from the abandonment of nuclear 
energy and that Swiss nuclear power plants offered sufficient 
guarantees in terms of security and environment. On 23 
September 1984, both initiatives were rejected with roughly the 
same proportion of opponents (about 55% disagreed, electoral 
turnout 41.7%). The analysis of voting behaviour (VOX) noted a 
cleavage at the regional level (the percentage of agreement to the 
two initiatives was higher in the Italian-speaking part, in the 
Geneva region, the Jura and Basel) and at the level of partisan 
sympathy (more left-wing voters accepted the initiative)
5
. This 
rejection did not ring the death knell for anti-nuclear social 
mobilisation: in 1986, activists began collecting signatures for 
two initiatives (‘to abandon atomic energy’ and ‘to stop the 
construction of nuclear power plants — moratorium’).  
In 1986, the Chernobyl cloud unfolded over Europe, which 
destroyed the possibility of distancing: it became evident that 
one cannot escape the consequences of a nuclear accident. More 
generally, risks — nuclear ones and of other kinds — and risk 
distribution characterized the new form of ‘risk society’ (Beck, 
1992). Beck described how the characteristics of nuclear risks — 
from modernization, global, escaping perception, with a potential 
of disaster so high that it is almost impossible to act a posteriori 
— were typical of this society. ‘In other words, what becomes 
clear in risk discussions are the features and gaps between 
scientific and social rationality in dealing with the hazardous 
potential of civilization. Social movements raise questions that 
are not answered by the risk technicians at all, and the 
technicians answer questions which miss the point of what was 
really asked and what feeds public anxiety’ (Beck, 1992:30). The 
Chernobyl cloud was especially detected in the Italian-speaking 
part of Switzerland, and the effects of this accident are still 
observable today, twenty years after the accident (OFSP, 2006). 
__________ 
5 These analyses are available at http://www2.unil.ch/daris/IMG/html/liste_ 
Vox_Voxit_f.html. 
106 JOURNAL OF SCIENTIFIC TEMPER, VOL. 1(3&4), JULY 2013 
The project of construction at Kaiseraugst was abandoned two 
years after the Chernobyl accident. 
In this sensitive context for nuclear issues, empirical studies 
began to document public perceptions. However, no large survey 
was conducted on that issue: it mostly consisted of items 
included in surveys related to science or to the environment. The 
results of the Gfs surveys between 1986 and 1990 showed that 
around 60% of respondents considered that ‘risks posed by 
nuclear energy are unacceptable’ (Figure 1), that is, shortly after 
the Chernobyl accident. 
To sum up, the Swiss population was strongly mobilised 
against the construction of nuclear plants in the 70s and 80s. 
Even if the people refused to prevent or restrict the operating 
conditions of nuclear energy in Switzerland, anti-nuclear 
activists recorded their first success at Kaiseraugst. 
 
1990-2005: the first political success with the moratorium 
The 1990s began with two initiatives related to nuclear energy: 
one requiring nuclear power phase-out and the other a ten-year 
moratorium against the construction of new nuclear power 
stations. The first was rejected by 52.9% of voters (electoral 
Figure 1 — Approval of the statement ‘Risks posed by nuclear energy are 
unacceptable’ (in %) 
 
Source: UNIVOX (2005) 
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turnout 40.4%) but the second — a ten-year moratorium — was 
accepted by 54.5% (electoral turnout 40.4%). The VOX analysis, 
realised after the vote, showed that decisive motives were 
multiple: among supporters of the initiative, it is the fear of 
nuclear power plants and radioactive waste as well as the need 
for a ten-year time for reflection that prevailed while opponents 
were afraid of energy insufficiency and saw no alternative to the 
use of nuclear power. In general, the majority of respondents 
believed that too much energy got wasted, that atomic energy 
and radioactive waste were hazardous, that alternative energy 
was functional, that new nuclear plants were unnecessary, and 
finally that the economic effects of abandonment were 
acceptable. 
In the ISSP Environment surveys
6
 realised in Switzerland, 
48.5% of respondents knew in 1994 the number of nuclear plants 
operating
7
 and 20% of respondents felt affected by nuclear 
power plants, but this percentage reached 37% in French-
speaking part and 25% in the Italian-speaking part (Diekmann 
and Franzen, 1997). In 2000, 14 years after Chernobyl, 58% of 
Swiss respondents of ISSP Environment believed that a nuclear 
accident is likely (31% unlikely and 11% have no opinion). 
More, 21% of respondents considered nuclear power plants as 
extremely dangerous, and 32% very dangerous. Men considered 
the probability of a nuclear accident as less likely and considered 
nuclear plants to be safer than women did; more educated people 
acknowledged in a minor way the possibility of a nuclear 
accident and considered nuclear power plants to be safer than 
less educated people did. These individual factors that influence 
responses are consistent with literature (Boy, 2007; Pidgeon 
et al., 2008; Keller et al., 2012). 
This increase of concerns towards nuclear energy was also 
observed in the UNIVOX surveys (Figure 1): the statement 
‘Risks posed by nuclear energy are unacceptable’ was 
__________ 
6 The ISSP survey is an annual, cross-national collaboration within which each 
country undertakes a survey on rotating issues with nationally representative 
samples of the adult population (sample size between 1,000 and 1,400). 
7 Precisely, 33.5% in the Italian-speaking part, 34% in the French-speaking part 
and 53.2% in the German-speaking part (where all the Swiss nuclear plants 
are located). 
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approved by roughly 50% of the population in the 1990s 
and by 76% in 2001. 
In the 2000 Biotechnology EB survey
8
, 26% of respondents 
estimated that nuclear energy will improve our way of life in the 
next 20 years, but 33% felt that it will make it worse (24% 
estimated there would be no effect, (Table 1). However, the 
percentage of negative effect increased in the following EB 
(52% in 2002, 59% in 2005) and at the same time, the percentage 
of people without opinion decreased (11% in 2002, 7% in 2005). 
In 2003, Swiss people had to vote again on nuclear power 
phase-out and the extension of the moratorium against nuclear 
power plants. The campaign was very intense and, according to 
some sources
9
, EconomieSuisse, a corporate union for the 
development of the Swiss economy, would have given 15 
million CHF to fight the two initiatives. This is a result of the 
tension between economy and ecology on the nuclear energy 
issue. On 18 May 2003, 66.3% of voters rejected the phase-out 
and 58.4% rejected the moratorium extension (around 49.7% of 
participation). However, the VOX analysis realised after the vote 
showed that left wing and green voters were more likely to 
accept the initiatives, whereas right wing ones were more likely 
to reject it. Even among opponents to the initiatives, a majority 
said they were opposed to the construction of new nuclear power 
Table 1 — Effect of nuclear energy in our way of life in the next 20 years 
(in %; EB) 
 Positive effect Negative effect No effect DK 
2000 26 33 24 17 
2002 15 52 22 11 
2005 31 59 3 7 
2010 33 40 18 9 
Source: Analyses from the author 
__________ 
8 The EB surveys, financed by the European Commission, have been conducted 
between two and five times per year since 1973; they measure the state of 
public opinion toward the European Union and other issues, including science. 
The national samples come from a multistage random design of the adult 
population, with approximately 1,000 face-to-face interviews conducted. 
9 See for example, Work 18 March 2011. 
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plants, thereby approving the main and true claim of the 
moratorium. 
To sum up, nuclear energy was under threat at the beginning 
of this period, but ended on a positive note with the results of the 
2003 vote. This may result from the actions of the nuclear lobby 
but also from those of the Swiss Federal Office of Energy, 
which played the role of mediator, trying to relaunch a 
constructive dialogue between opposing views on nuclear energy 
(Romerio, 2008). 
 
2005-2011: nuclear revival 
After the mid 2000s, two main issues changed circumstances for 
nuclear energy. In February 2005, the Kyoto protocol entered 
into force — a protocol ratified by Switzerland in 2003. The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) submitted 
its report in February 2007. This period witnessed a change of 
image of nuclear energy. After the Second World War, nuclear 
energy was depicted as protective toward the nature in 
comparison to big hydropower projects (Favez and Mysyrowicz, 
1987). But in the 1980s and 1990s, disasters such as Three Mile 
Island (1979) or Chernobyl (1986), as well as the problems of 
nuclear waste, categorised it as an environmentally unfriendly 
energy source. However, in the 2000s, concerns about the 
climate changed the image of nuclear energy, which was from 
then on depicted as climate friendly and carbon-free. The second 
issue is the financial crisis of 2007-2008: if the crisis hit 
Switzerland to a lesser extent than neighbouring countries, it 
engendered in the population concerns about the future. The 
electricity sector argued that an imbalance in the electricity 
market, due to the renunciation of nuclear energy, would be a 
hindrance to economic development. 
The 2008 EB on nuclear waste indicated that 40% of the 
Swiss respondents were in favour of nuclear energy, whereas 
52% were opposed, and 65% thought that it was advantageous 
because it emitted less greenhouse gases than, for instance, oil 
and coal (Swiss Federal Office of Energy, 2008). However, this 
advantage was more frequently acknowledged among men 
(73%), among older people (69% of the 55 years old and more), 
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among the more educated (70% among tertiary level) and among 
people on the right side of the political scale. Simultaneously, the 
Gfs surveys showed a strong decrease of approval of the 
statement ‘Risks posed by nuclear energy are unacceptable’ 
between 2001 (76%) to 2008 (46%) (Figure 1). 
In 2010, only 40% of the Swiss respondents to EB Science 
considered that nuclear energy will have a negative effect on our 
way of life in the next 20 years (33% positive, 18% no effect, 
Table 1). These percentages varied, however, greatly among 
subgroups of the population: 43% of negative effect among 
women and 37% among men; 36% of negative effect among 
people aged 65 and more but 44% among people between 25 and 
34 years old; 49% of negative effect among people living in 
large towns against 35% among people living in rural areas; 52% 
of negative effect in the French-speaking part, 37% in the 
German-speaking part and 34% in the Italian-speaking part.  
At the end of this period, replacement of some nuclear power 
plants was necessary (for example, Mühleberg should stop in 
December 2012) and the general public would have a direct vote 
in this procedure. Nuclear energy was therefore more and more 
discussed in the political and public arena. Keller et al., (2012) 
highlighted differences of affective imagery of nuclear power 
among opponents and supporters of replacement of nuclear 
power plants in Switzerland: the first made more concrete and 
diverse associations (with risks negative feelings, accidents, 
radioactivity, waste, military use, negative consequences for 
health and environment) than the latter (with energy, necessity, 
description of nuclear power plants), which has practical 
implications for risk communications. 
In addition, the problem of nuclear waste was still unsettled 
in Switzerland
10
 and possible sites were discussed in the media 
along with planned public consultations. In anticipation, the 
nuclear lobby bought pages in newspapers and commercials on 
television, where nuclear energy was described as climate 
__________ 
10 Since 2006, nuclear wastes have no more been sent to France or Germany, 
they have been since then sent to cool down in a large water pool in 
Würenlingen (AG). For an overview of Swiss nuclear waste management, see 
Kuppler (2012). 
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friendly, carbon-free and economic. Some sources state that 
Swiss nuclear lobby groups spend about 3 Million CHF per year, 
but the overall budget is non-available
11
. Part of the actions of 
the lobby were surveys, which showed positive trends of 
acceptance of nuclear energy; since 2004, around 80% of Swiss 
people consider existing nuclear power plants rather safe
12
 
(Figure 2) and around 70% of the population agree that nuclear 
stations are needed to provide electricity in Switzerland. If in 
2004 and 2005, more respondents were opposed to rather than in 
favour of replacement of old nuclear power plants, since then the 
majority has been in favour and its percentage increased (51% in 
2006, 55% in 2009). 
By conducting surveys, the pro-nuclear lobby seemed to 
target two well-known goals of the survey: first, the agenda-
setting of the issue and, second, an improvement of the image of 
the issue. By highlighting that the majority of citizens support 
their own position, the pro-nuclear lobby sidelines the opinion of 
opponents to nuclear energy. However, those surveys showed 
public acceptance of nuclear energy so different from other 
Figure 2 — Results on the statement ‘Do you consider the existing nuclear 
power plants in Switzerland rather safe or rather dangerous?’ (in %, green 
rather safe, red rather dangerous, white DK, Swissnuclear) 
 
Source: Swissnuclear (2011) 
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11 See for example, the following articles in the media: Beobachter 1 October 
2010, NZZ am Sonntag 21 November 2010, der Sonntag 20 March 2011. 
12 The percentages are slightly lower in the French-speaking part than in the 
German-speaking part, where all existing nuclear power plants are located. 
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surveys’ results13 that the media pointed the huge discrepancies 
that did not fit within ‘normal’ margin of errors (L’Hebdo, 27 
March, 2007). 
In summary, this period saw a positive trend for nuclear 
energy acceptance due to external factors (climate change, 
financial crisis) and to an increase of means and actions of the 
nuclear lobby in Switzerland. 
 
2011: the phase-out shortly after Fukushima 
At the time of the Fukushima accident, Switzerland had four 
active nuclear power plants (all located in the German-speaking 
part) and nuclear power accounted for 40% of the total electricity 
production in the country
14
. After the accident, the media 
coverage was high: 6,668 occurrences of the term 'Fukushima' in 
the German-speaking and French-speaking media in the sixteen 
weeks after the accident (Figure 3). The media published 
different types of articles on this issue (editorial, international 
and national sections, science, politics, economics and even 
people sections, readers’ comments, expert’s corner, etc.) and 
Figure 3 — Media coverage in the weeks 1 to 16 after the accident of 
Fukushima in the German-speaking (blue) and French-speaking (red) region 
 
 
Source: Crettaz von Roten (2011) 
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13 Keller et al., (2012) reported that in 2011 46% of the respondents of their 
study were in favor of replacing the existing nuclear power plants (36% 
opposed and 16% undecided), that is, 9% less than the results of Swissnuclear 
(2011). 
14 Hydroelectric power plants accounted for 55%. 
CRETTAZ: SOCIETY, POLITICS AND NUCLEAR ENERGY IN SWITTZERLAND 113 
followed mainly four frames for science-related policy debates 
(Nisbet and Scheufele, 2009): the frame of governance and 
public accountability, of scientific and technical uncertainty, of 
alternative path, and, less frequently, of economic development 
(Crettaz von Roten, in prep.). 
As the issue of nuclear energy was clearly framed as 
political before the accident — the issue was described as 
essential for the national elections that would occur in October, 
2011 — the issue remained mainly political after Fukushima. On 
14 March, 2011, the Federal Council decided a moratorium on 
the construction of new nuclear power plants for an indefinite 
period of time. The left parties, historically opponents to nuclear 
energy, asked the Federal Council (15 March, 2011) to elaborate 
a law to withdraw from nuclear and to close the oldest nuclear 
power plants in Switzerland. Civil society organisations and 
stakeholders were highly active (Greanpeace, WWF, Pro 
Natura, Sortir du nucléaire, Non au nucléaire, etc.); they 
organised, for instance, demonstrations (e.g. in March against 
Alpic, in May near Beznau, in June and September near 
Mühleberg). 
A week after the accident appeared in the Sunday 
newspapers
15
 the results of a survey were realised shortly after 
the accident (17-19 March, 2011). According to them, 87% of 
the Swiss population wanted a withdrawal from nuclear energy; 
62% wanted the oldest Swiss nuclear power plants to be stopped 
and 74% were opposed to the construction of new nuclear plants. 
Compared to a similar survey realised in January 2010, the 
percentage of people in favour of the construction of new power 
plants dropped from 55% to 21%. This survey had a huge impact 
as it was reported in most Swiss newspapers and on televisions, 
underpinning the argument that the population wanted a 
withdrawal from nuclear energy
16
. This survey had an effect of 
__________ 
15 A French-speaking and a German-speaking Sunday newspaper (Le Matin 
Dimanche and  Sontagszeitung) had commissioned and financed a survey on 
506 voters in the French- and German-speaking part, and published it on 
20 March 2011. 
16 These results were confirmed by other surveys, i.e. a survey from Gfs in May 
2011 reported that 84% of Swiss citizens supported the Federal Coucil’s 
decision to suspend the proceedings to construct new nuclear power plants and 
that 65% of Swiss people agreed to withdraw from nuclear even if this meant a 
significant increase in the price of energy for consumers. 
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closure, preventing to consider ‘other outcomes’ to the 
catastrophe than that which emerged from the survey. 
Information emerged about nuclear safety
17
 and about some 
accidents having occurred on Swiss nuclear power plants before. 
After that, the green party announced the launch of a popular 
initiative for nuclear phase-out (20 March, 2011) if the 
government did not take this decision itself. Some right-wing 
parties, which were historically pro-nuclear, showed more 
openness to a withdrawal from nuclear energy. A kind of 
political consensus thus seems to have emerged in the spring; 
parties differ however on the withdrawal’s time frame. 
An internal document of Areva (25 March, 2011) considered 
that most governments ‘had pretty rational reactions following 
Fukushima’ except Switzerland and Italy. On May 25, the 
Federal Council opted for the scenario of withdrawal from 
nuclear energy by 2035. In the end of summer, the legislative 
(the Council of States and the National Council) confirmed this 
scenario but allowed research in the nuclear field (28 September, 
2011). Projects for alternative sources of energy emerged (solar 
or wind energy, hydropower, natural gas power stations), even if 
those also raised some criticisms and oppositions (for example, 
on the part of citizens living close to wind power projects). 
On 6 September, 2011, the socialist party launched a popular 
initiative named ‘Cleantech’ that proposed a move toward 
sustainable energy in Switzerland. The government issued a call 
for projects intended to stimulate energy saving. By the end of 
2011, electricity consumption in Switzerland decreased by 2%. 
Sustainable energy and energy saving have emerged as two 
pillars for the future. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
This article has documented why current decisions on nuclear 
energy in Switzerland cannot be considered in historical 
isolation. The opposition to nuclear energy that began in the 
__________ 
17 The results of a study PEGASOS, conducted by 21 European experts and 
published in 2006, concluded that the earthquake risks in Switzerland were 
twice as large as had been previously estimated. The oldest nuclear stations 
have been sized according to values today considered as obsolete. 
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1970s was, in part, a resistance to this new technology, but also 
an indicator of the transformation of the social references — in 
particular about the definition of the relationship between 
humans and the environment, about the role of the State and 
about the market economy. Therefore, the 1970s society’s 
change of attitudes affected not only nuclear energy, but science 
and technology in general; however points of view were 
crystallized on nuclear energy. On the one hand, opponents 
rejected a technology that would make society more 
misanthropic, that engendered risks toward the environment and 
that was governed by a too powerful industry. On the other hand, 
supporters of nuclear energy complained that the technology was 
victim of an irrational and ignorant society, which is one of the 
first occurrences of the deficit model
18
. A series of accidents 
(Three Mile Island, Saint-Laurent-des-Eaux, Chernobyl and 
Fukushima) have increased the share of the opposition and have 
therefore sounded the death knell for nuclear energy in 
Switzerland. 
However, nuclear energy was the first of a long list of 
scientific issues that generated a resistance in society: 
biotechnology, information technology, nanotechnology, etc. All 
these scientific issues have shaped the ‘scientific temper’ of the 
Swiss people. The current attitudes towards science are rather 
positive, but concerns exist about the foreseen and unforeseen 
consequences of interfering with nature (Crettaz von Roten, 
2012). This is specially the case with animal experimentation, 
biotechnology and nanotechnology. The ‘scientific temper’ is 
reinforced by direct democracy that regularly leads to gain 
information and to debate on scientific issues. Buchmann (1995) 
interpreted initiatives in the case of scientific and technological 
issues as a form of public resistance to technology. 
Switzerland illustrates the European convergence towards 
participatory decision-making procedures on scientific 
developments; however, people in Europe were not called to the 
polls as often as the Swiss population in order to make decisions 
in the energy area (Romerio, 2008). To sustain the debate 
__________ 
18 This model refers to the assumption that the more the lay people know 
science and technology, the more they will love it. 
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between science and the Swiss society, various initiatives have 
been taken: creation of the Science and Society Foundation — in 
charge, among other things, of the Swiss science festival — 
generalisation of universities’ open days, consensus conferences, 
science cafés, etc. 
This evolution of public perception and political actions 
towards nuclear energy is not specific to Switzerland. For 
example, a similar trend of opinions has been documented in the 
USA (Pidgeon et al., 2008). In some European countries, similar 
political decisions have been taken. In 1987, one year after the 
Chernobyl disaster, Italy decided by referendum the phase-out of 
nuclear power and the four Italian nuclear power plants 
operating were arrested, the last one in 1990. In Austria, the 
production of nuclear energy was prohibited by the 
‘Constitutional Law for a nuclear-free Austria’ in 1999. In 2000, 
the German Chancellor fixed the withdrawal from nuclear 
energy in 2020 and, in March 2011, Angela Merkel decided to 
permanently shut down eight reactors and declared the definitive 
cessation of all German nuclear plants by 2022 at the latest.  
This does not mean that the issue of nuclear energy is over 
from a social sciences’ point of view. Future research should 
examine the influence of the Fukushima accident in various 
areas: on the evolution of nuclear energy acceptance, on the 
affective imagery of nuclear power, on the implementation of 
political decisions, etc. 
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